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December 1 , 1977

Honowblc Justices
Utah Suprc:me Court
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re: Wilson v. Wilson
Supreme Court No.

15277

Drcar Justices:
In the above-captioned case the trial transcript constitutes part
of the record. However, this transcript is very confusing since it was not
properly dated or arranged by the district court reporters. Therefore, the
purpose of this letter is to alleviate potential :;onfusion which might result
as you read through the transcript.
This case actually came on for trial on the 14th and 17th days of
January, 1977 and on the llth day of February, 1977. Thus, the title page
of that portion of the transcript bound in the red binder is incorrect and misleading. Pages l thru 73 of the red binder actually contain the transcript
for the first day of trial, January 14th. A transcript of the next day of trial,
January 17th, is contained in the green binder. Finally, the transcript for
the third and final day of trial, February 11, 1977, is contained in pages 74
thru 102 of the red binder.
Thus, in order to read the transcript of this case in its proper
ehronolog ical order, pages l thru 73 of the red trial transcript should first be
read, then pages l thru 73 of the green trial transcript should be read and
finally pages 74 Lhru 102 of the red trial transcript should be read.
Since there were two reporters involved in making up the transcript
and since these reporters did not number the pages consecutively; defendantappellant in his brief has indicated which trial transcript--red or green-- he
is quoting from or using as authority.
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Honorilblc ]usticc:s
DcccmbcrlG, 1977
Pugc Two

Although the trial transcripts are not properly arranged, they do appear
to be complete in all respects.
Very truly yours,
STRONG & HANNI

RAB:lge

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE • • •

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1

PROPERTY AWARDED PLAINTIFF

6

PROPERTY AWARDED DEFENDANT

7

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO REVIEW
THE EVIDENCE AND TO CORRECT ANY INEQUITIES
RESULTING FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.

10

POINT II. THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION ORDERED BY
THE TRIAL COURT WAS IMPROPER, HIGHLY INEQUITABLE TO
THE DEFENDANT AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION.
• • • • • • • • • • • • •

12

A. Total Value of Property Award was Clearly
Excessive.

12

B. Plaintiff's Award of $2,000.00 on Defendant's
1976 Tax Refund Finds Absolutely No Support in
the Evidence. . . • . . • • • • • • • • • • .

16

C. Defendant's Trust Fund was Not Properly Valued
and Resulted in an Inflated Value Being Placed on His
Entire Share of the Estate.

17

D. Defendant's Suggested Remedy of the Inequitable
Property Distribution.
. • . . • • • • . • • • .

18

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT ALIMONY AWARD OF
$900.00 PER MONTH WAS HIGHLY INEQUITABLE TO DEFENDANT
AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL
COURT.
. . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

19

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

Needs of Spouse.

20

B.

Short Duration of Marriage.

23

C. Permanence of Award.

25

D. Defendant's Suggested Remedy of Alimony
Inequity.
• •••.

26

CONCLUSION . • . .

27
Authorities

Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d 681 (1951)

20 .

Andersonv. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 (1943)

20

Barrett v. Barrett, 17 Utah 2d 1, 403 P. 2d 649 (1965)

19, 20, 21

Carter v. Carter, 563 P. 2d 177 (Utah 1977)

19

Christensenv. Christensen, 21 Utah2d263, 444P.2d511 (1968)

25

Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) . • .

i
11' 19:

DeRosa v. DeRosa, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1968)

25

Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (1973)

11' 15

Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569 P. 2d 1104 (Utah 1977)

12

Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 130, 493 P.2d 620 (1972)

12

Frank v. Frank, 18 Utah 2d 228, 419 P.2d 199 (1966)
Graziano v. Graziano, 7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931 (1958)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ii

20, ZJ

11

Hampton v. Hampton, 80 Utah 570, 47 P.2d 419 (1935)

11

Kline v. Kline, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975)

15

••.•.

Ku1av. Kula, 181 Neb. 531, 149 N.W. 2d 430 (1967)

18

Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958)

11

McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066
Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265

12, 18, 19

....

12, 18, 19, 20, 23, 26

Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 166 P.2d 516 (1946)

• • 11, 26

Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 2 57, 53 P. 2d 428 (1936)

11' 20' 24

Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974)

10' 15

Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257

18

Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis, 14 Utah 2d 273, 382 P.2d 412 (1963)

10

Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P. 2d 928

16

• •

Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 997 (1956)

11' 26

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
111OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCHELLE RITCHIE WILSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No: 15277

-vsROBERT GAINES WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal arises out of a divorce action.
does not contest the Decree of Divorce itself.

Defendant-appellant

However, he is contesting

the property division and alimony award ordered by the Trial Court. Defendant
maintains that the property awarded plaintiff-respondent, his former wife, was
excessive in amount and was not warranted by the evidence; furthermore, the
permanent alimony award to plaintiff of $900.00 per month was excessive
both in amount and duration.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 2 7, 1969, plaintiff and defendant were married in Salt Lake
City, Utah. This was a second marriage for both persons. Defendant had
two sons by his previous marriage, both of whom presently reside in North
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

--

Carolina with their mother.

Defendant is obligated to pay $500.00 per

month in child support for the maintenance of these two boys.

1

In addition

he is obligated to maintain a $20,000.00 life insurance policy on his life
with his two sons as joint beneficiaries; maintain health insurance on both
sons; provide funds for all education that either son may need or desire
beyond high school to and including graduate and professional schools.

2

Plaintiff also had two children, a son and a daughter by a previous
marriage. The ages of these children were twelve and ten, respectively,
when plaintiff and defendant were married. The daughter, Kelly, resided
with plaintiff and defendant during almost the entire course of their
marriage. Trey, the son, lived for over a year with the parties.

Defendant

provided the sole support for these children during this period with the
exception of $50.00 per month which each child received as child support
from plaintiff's former husband.

3

Defendant was a generous provider.

Besides giving each child complete medical and dental care and a private
room, bath and furniture, he provided, among other things, the following:
bicycles, stereos, ski equipment, numerous trips, private dancing lessons,

1

2
3

Green TR. p. 40.
Green TR. p. 41.
Red TR. p. 49.

-2-
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private diving lessons, ski lessons, private tutors, psychological testing.

4

When the parties were married, plaintiff did not bring any assets into
the marriage excepting a few household items - pots, pans, some dishes and
silver, sewing machine, washer and dryer.

5

On the other hand, defendant

contributed substantial assets to the marriage. These assets included the
following:

1969 automobile with a value of $3,500.00,

home in the sum of $15,000.00.

7

6

down payment on a

(When the house was sold, defendant's

$15,000.00 was then used to partially finance the purchase of the condominium
in which the parties then resided); four monthly payments on the parties'
home totaling $2,000.00.

8

(This money was also subsequently invested

in the condominium). Office equipment valued at $2,000.00.

9

Although prior to the parties' marriage, plaintiff had been employed
as a doctor's assistant and as a licensed expert technician,

10

she never

worked during the marriage despite the fact that defendant had encouraged

4
5
6
7

8

9

10

Green TR. pp. 39-40.
Red TR. p. 50.
Green TR. p. 28.
Defendant's testimony at trial was that he had made a down payment of
approximately $10,000.00. (Green TR. p. 28) However, Exhibit "A" to
defendant's Memorandum of Law establishes that defendant actually paid
in excess of $15,000.00 for this down payment. (R. p. 91)
Green TR. p. 29.
GreenTR. p. 48.
Red TR. p. 48.
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her to do so on numerous occasions. For example, defendant testified as
follows:
"Q.

Did she work at all during the marriage?

"A.

No.

"Q.

Did you have any discussions with her about working?

"A. Yes . . . On many occasions we discussed the
possibility of her working. She did not have enough
to occupy her time. Was always wondering what to do
with her time and I suggested she regain herself as an
x-ray technician and when she rejected that idea, I
asked if she would like to be employed as a pottery
helper or art instructor or feeling that she could help
me in the office part time. All of these discussions
were held in an on-going manner throughout the marriage.
"Q.

And did she endeavor to do any of these?

"A.

No.

"Q.

Did she ever say why?

"A.

No, she just didn't want to. "

11

Plaintiff contributed absolutely nothing of a monetary nature to the accrual
of the estate of plaintiff and defendant.
During the course of their marriage defendant worked unceasingly.
Through his diligent efforts he was able to accumulate the property which
forms part of the subject matter of this appeal.
On APril 1 , 1976, approximately six years and seven months after
the marriage of Dr. and Mrs. Wilson, Mrs. Wilson filed her complaint

11

Green TR. pp. 32-33.
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seeking a divorce, alimony of $1,000.00 per month, and an equal division
of all real and personal property which

r::r.

Wilson brought into the marriage

and which he was able to accumulate during the tenure of the marriage. 12
She did not seek child support since no children were ever born to the
plaintiff and defendant.
From the date of the filing of this action until after the trial court
rendered judgment in May of 1977, defendant paid plaintiff the following
amounts: $1,200.00 cash; $1 ,000. 00 which he left in the checking account;
all household bills; an airline ticket to North Carolina worth $286. 00; $400.00
in psychiatric bills for plaintiff; $250.00 cash.

13

In addition defendant

paid plaintiff $6,200.00 so she could purchase a new automobile; he paid
her temporary alimony at $650.00 per month since June of 1976 for a total
sum of $7,800 .00; and he allowed her exclusive occupancy of the condominium.
While defendant was making the aforementioned payments, he resided
alone in a small apartment.
On January 14, 17 and February 11, this case came on for trial
before the HonorableG. Hal Taylor. After the trial had concluded the court
granted plaintiff a divorce and announced a property distribution. The property

12
13
14

R. p. 2.
Plaintiff has not disputed that these payments were made. They are
summarized in defendant's Affidavit to the trial court. (R. p. 17)
Trial court's Order of Temporary Support.

(R. pp. 25-26)
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14

was distributed as listed below.

As might be expected in a case of this

nature, conflicting evidence was offered as to the value of the respective
items of property. For purposes of this brief, defendant is giving plaintiff

the benefit of the doubt and is accepting her valuations for most of the property
listed below.

Documentation and explanation of these values can be found ln

the footnotes.
PROPERTY AWARDED PLAINTIFF

A.

VALUE

Condominium at 6066 South 1480 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah

$ 80,000.oo

B.

Three lots in North Carolina

c.

Plaintiff's automobile

6,200.oo

D.

Diamond ring

6,ooo.oo

E.

Stoneware

15

12,000.00

400.oo

15
16
17
18
19

RedTr. p. 37, P. Ex. 15, D. Ex. 21. This condominium was described
at trial as follows:

"It is a 2-story condominium in Village Three. It has approximately
3100 square feet, out garage and patio. It has upstairs; a living
room, dining room, kitchen with bar, large master bedroom, private
bath and closet, a second full bath upstairs, study, a laundry room.
And downstairs is a large finished bedroom with private bath and
closet, another finished bedroom and a medium-size family room,
plus a large workshop area, semi-finished."
16
17
18
19

P. Ex. 15.

R. p. 25.
D. Ex. 19.

P. Ex. 13.
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F.

Furniture in condominium with the exception of
the items specifically awarded to the defendant

G.

Personal items

H.

$2,000.00 from defendant's 1976 income tax refund

PROPERTY AWARDED DEFENDANT

6,896.00
None

20

21

2,ooo.oo 22
VALUE

23

A.

Interest in profit sharing trust

B.

Partnership interest

30,ooo.oo 24

c.

Interest in professional corporation

15,636.73

20

21

22
23

24
25

$100,000.00

25

Red TR. p. 71, P. Ex. 14. Plaintiff's attorney agreed that plaintiff had
valued the personal property in the condominium at $8,316.00. From this
figure $1,420.00 was subtracted since defendant was awarded personal
property which plaintiff herself had valued at $1,420.00. Presumably the
$6,896.00 figure included the value of the man's chest and the corner table
which were awarded plaintiff and which were specified separately in the
divorce decree. (R. p. 130)
There was no testimony as to the value of these items and said items
were not specified.
Absolutely no evidence was introduced at trial to warrant the award of
this sum to plaintiff.
Red TR. p. 2 9, wherein it was stated that defendant's interest in the
trust was 80% of$12 5, 000.00. Defendant, however, disputes this
valuation as will be discussed below.
P. Ex. 10 through 12 and Red TR. p. 28.
Plaintiff's Ex. 9, Red TR. p. 11. This $15,636.73 figure includes the
value of defendant's automobile, filing drawer and desk, naugahyde
stool, lamp, suecechairs, bookcase, etagere. See P. Ex. 9 and Red
TR. pp. 21, 59, 61, 63.
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D.

Cattle

E.

Rocks and equipment

101635.00

F.

Ranch in North Carolina

10iooo.oo

G.

Cottonwood Country Club membership

H.

Beach Mountain lot

None

I.

Trailer

700.oo

J.

Sheep horns

None

K.

Fish trap tables

L.

Bronze goblets 1 plates and flatware

M.

Money in bank accounts

26

26

$ 6120o.oo

11ooo.oo

27
28
29

30
31

32

2o.oo
127.00
21531.92

33
34
35

Red TR. pp. 72 73.
1

27
28

Defendant disputes this valuation. In plaintiff's opinion the rocks
and equipment are worth $2 1960.00. See D. Ex. 21.
P. Ex. 15. Defendant valued his interest in this ranch at $3 000.00.
See D. Ex. 21.
1

29

30
31
32

33
34
35

R. p. 92.

Red TR. p. 75.

Neither party offered any evidence as to the value of plaintiff's equity
in this lot. SeeP. Ex. 15 1 D. Ex. 21.
D. Ex. 21.
No evidence was offered by either party as to the value of these horns.
P. Ex. 14.
P. Ex. 13.
Plaintiff listed the value of defendant's bank accounts at $28, 531.92.
However, from this figure must be subtracted the $20,000.00 which
defendant was required to repay his father's estate. Green TR. pp. 25,
26. (And the $6,000.00 which he placed in an educational trust fund for
the benefit of his two sons by the former marriage) Green TR. p. 41.
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N.

o.

1976 tax refund except $2,000. 00 which was paid
plaintiff

Personal items

$

9,399.oo

None

36

37

When the foregoing figures are added up they show that plaintiff
received property with a value of $104,600.00.

Defendant received property

of a total value of $176,850.65, if one considers the value of his profit
sharing trust at a full $100,000.00 and if the 1976 tax refund is also
included.

38

As stated, plaintiff also received the sum of $17,136.00 from
defendant prior to the entry of the final divorce decree on May 6, 1977.
When this figure, minus the $6,200.00 which she spent for her new automobile,
is added to the monetary value of plaintiff's property settlement, it is
apparent that at the time the divorce was granted, plaintiff had received
property and payments totaling the sum of $115,536.00.

36

37
38

Defendant maintains that this refund should not be considered as a
portion of the marital estate since absolutely no evidence was offered
concerning it at trial. The only reference at all concerning it occurred
in an Addendum to Plaintiff's Memorandum to the Trial Court submitted
almost two months after the trial had concluded, (R. p. 120)
No evidence whatsoever was offered concerning what these items
consisted of or their value.
Defendant maintains that the trust fund should have been valued at
most at $50,000.00 and that the 1976 tax refund should not have been
considered as part of the marital estate by either party. Taking these
factors into account, the total value of defendant's property distribution
is $117,451.65.
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This was not all that plaintiff was granted by the trial court.
was also awarded attorney's fees in the sum of $6,000.00.

She

In addition, she

received a permanent award of alimony in the sum of $900.00 per month.

At

the date of the trial plaintiff was 40 years old. If one assumes that she draws
alimony at the present rate until she is 65 years of age, her total alimony
award would be in excess of $270,000.00.
POINT I.
THIS COURT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE
AND TO CORRECT ANY INEQUITIES RESULTING FROM THE
TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT.
The Utah Supreme Court has often expressed the thought recently
articulated in the following dicta from Searle v. Searle,

522 P. 2d 697 (Utah

1974) wherein the court stated:
"Although it is both the duty and prerogative
of this court in a case of equity to review the facts
as well as the law, Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution
of Utah, the trial judge has considerable latitude of
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests
in a divorce case. "
See also, Tsoufakis v. Tsoufckis, 14 Utah 2d 2 73, 382 P. 2d 412 (196!
wherein the Utah court stated:
"Although a divorce case is equitable in nature, and this court
will review the evidence and may substitute its judgment for
that of the trial court under proper circumstances, it will not
disturb a trial court's judgment in the division of property or
awards of alimony and child support unless it appears to be
unjust and inequitable and therefore an abuse of discretion.
Whether the awards of the division of property is unjust or inequitable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances in
each particular case."
However, a review of Utah cases decided within the last forty years
indicates the Utah court not only carefully reviews the evidence but it also
often substitutes its judgment for that of the trial court in alimony and
property distribution matters.

A partial listing of authorities reads as

follows: Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (1973) (Court
disallows alimony award of $375.00 per month); Martinett v. Martinett,
8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821 (1958) (Supreme Court reduces an excessive
property award which the trial court granted plaintiff); Dehm v. Dehm, 545
P.2d 525 (Utah 1976) (Supreme Court reduces wife's alimony from $300.00
per month to $1 . 00 per month); Porter v. Porter, 109 Utah 444, 16 6 P. 2d
516 (1946) (Supreme Court reduces alimony award from $40.00 per month
for two years to $40.00 per month for six months); Hampton v. Hampton,
80 Utah 570, 47 P.2d 419 (1935) (Supreme Court reduces award of alimony
which trial court granted wife from $54.00 per month to $45.00 per month);
Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 25 7, 53 P. 2d 428 (1936) (Supreme Court reduces
an excessive alimony award to a lump sum of $1,500. 00); Graziano v. Graziano,
7 Utah 2d 187, 321 P.2d 931 (1958) (Decree granting wife a divorce was
modified by striking award of alimony and attorney's fees); Wilson v. Wilson,
5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 997 (1956) (Supreme Court reduced defendant's
$100.00 month payment period for alimony to forty-eight months); Felt v. Felt,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated-11OCR, may contain errors.

27 Utah 2d 130, 493 P.2d 620 (1972} (Supreme Court remanded the case
for a new trial in order for the trial court to evaluate circumstances which
might merit a reduction in alimony).
Numerous other Utah cases could be cited in which the Supreme
Court held that circumstances warranted a modification of the trial court's
award of property and alimony.

In the present case those same circumstances

exist and the trial court's decree should be modified.
POINT II.
THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION ORDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT
WAS IMPROPER, HIGHLY INEQUITABLE TO THE DEFENDANT
AND CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISCRETION.
A. Total value of property award was clearly excessive.
The Utah Supreme Court still endorses Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255,
67 P.2d 265 and_McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 as
establishing the guidelines to which the trial court should look when making
property distribution awards in divorce cases. Ehninger v. Ehninger, 569
P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977).
In McDonald v. McDonald, Supra, Chief Justice Crockett prefaces
his remarks concerning the relevant factors which the trial court should
consider by stating:
"During the writer's experience as a trial judge the opinion
of Chief Justice Woolf in the case of Pinion v. Pinion, supra,
was found helpful. Based on that pattern the following was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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devised as a general formula for attempting to get all of the
factors together in perspective and compare and evaluate
them in adjusting the rights and obligations of the parties.
All may not be present or important in every case but we apply
them to the evidence herein. "
After this introduction, Justice Crockett stated the relevant factors
as follows:
"(1) the social position and standard of living of each
before marriage . . .
"(2)

the respective ages of each of the parties

"(3)

what each may have given up for the marriage

"(4)

what money or property each brought into the marriage

"(5)

the physical and mental health of the parties . • .

"(6)

the relative ability, training and education of the parties

"(7)

the time and duration of the marriage . . .

"(8) the present income of the parties and the property
acquired during marriage and owned either jointly or by
each now . . .
"(9)

how it was acquired and the efforts of each in doing so •••

"(10) children reared, their present ages, and obligations to them
or help which may in some instances be expected • . .
"(11) the present mental and physical health of the parties
"(12) the present age and life expectancy of the parties ••
"(13) the happiness and pleasure or lack of it, experienced
during marriage . . .
"(14) any extraordinary sacrifice, devotion or care which may
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have been given to the spouse or others, such as mother,
father, etc. , and obligations to other dependents having
a secondary right to support . . .
"(15) the present standard of living and needs of each including
the cost of living . . • "
A careful juxtaposition of the facts and circumstances of the instant

against the fifteen factors above enumerated clearly shows that Mrs. Wilson
property award of $115,536.00 was excessive in amount. For example, in

relation to Factor No. 4, she has not brought any significant property into th

marriage whereas the defendant brought into the marriage assets with a valuE
exceeding $20,000.00.

39

In relation to Factors 8 and 9, it must be noted that the property now
)

held was all acquired solely through the efforts of defendant.

Although

defendant repeatedly suggested that plaintiff obtain some sort of part-time
job, plaintiff refused to do so.

40

With respect to Factor No. 10, it is important that no children were
born to Dr. and Mrs. Wilson and the children of Mrs. Wilson by her first
marriage are now both old enough to make a significant contribution to their
own support and maintenance.
Factors 5 and 6 must also be evaluated.

Plaintiff is in good health

and as testiff.ed to at trial is capable of earning at least $750.00 a month as
a doctor's licensed technician.
39

41

Id. Notes 5-9.

40

Id.
Note
11.
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In the instant case, Factor No. 7 is perhaps the most important factor
to consider. Plaintiff and defendant were married but six years and seven
months when this divorce action was brought. The duration of this marriage
was simply too short to support such a huge property award as that granted
by the trial court.
After diligent search, defendant has only been able to find three Utah
divorce cases in which a property distribution was contested and in which the
wife was awarded property valued in excess of the property awarded plaintiff
in the instant case.

42

In each one of those three cases, compelling

circumstances not present here justified such an award. For example, in
Searle v. Searle, 522 P. 2d 697 (Utah 197 4) plaintiff got property valued at
$205,150.00. However, the court accented the facts that the parties had
been married over twenty-seven years and that plaintiff received absolutely
no alimony.
In Dubois v. Dubois, 29 Utah 2d 75, 504 P.2d 1380 (1973), the court
gave plaintiff sixty per cent of an estate valued at $588,581.00.

However,

the Supreme Court disallowed the $375.00 alimony award decreed by the
trial court.

Moreover, the court emphasized the fact that the parties had

been married for thirty years and that almost all of the assets which defendant
had invested to build his estate came from his plaintiff-wife.
42

In Kline v. Kline, 5 44 P. 2d 4 72 (Utah 1975), the parties stipulated that a
$1,748,809.98 estate should be divided so that the husband received
$931
, 602.63
and the
wife Funding
received
$7 43,387.
This
property
division
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InWeaverv. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166,442 P.2d 928, the plaintiff-wifE
was awarded property valued at $375,000.00.

However, she received no

alimony and was required to pay her own attorney's fees.

Moreover, again

the court accented the fact that the parties had been married over thirty years

and that the wife had worked extensively during the early years of the marriage
to provide for her and her husband. The court also emphasized the fact that
at the time of the divorce the wife was an invalid unable to work.
B.

Plaintiff's award of $2,000.00 on defendant's 1976 tax refund finds

absolutely no support in the evidence.
There was absolutely no evidence whatsoever submitted during the trial
which would suggest or even intimate that plaintiff should be awarded this
$2,000.00 sum.

Apparently, on or about April 5, 1977,- almost two months

after the trial in this case had concluded - plaintiff's attorney obtained a copy
of defendant's 1976 income tax return which was submitted to him for his client
signature.

Plaintiff's counsel then filed a Memorandum with the trial court,

attached the first page of defendant's tax return to that Memorandum and reque:
that the future tax refund be considered by the court in dividing the marital esti
Without any oral argument and more importantly without a shred of ev!CI

i
I

43

See Addendum to plaintiff's April 5, 1977, Memorandum to the trial
court. (R. p. 120)
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or testimony being offered at trial, the District Judge awarded plaintiff $2,000.00
of this refund based solely on the request made in plaintiff's Memorandum.
C.

Defendant's trust fund was not properly valued and resulted in an

inflated value being placed on his entire share of the estate.
The trial court should not have considered defendant's interest in the
trust fund as being worth $100,000.00 since the funds could not presently be
withdrawn without destroying the plan.
Even if the funds could be withdrawn and the trust terminated on the day
of plaintiff's divorce or at present, the following would result: The $100,000.00
in the pension trust would be considered income to Dr. Wilson for the year in
which the trust was terminated. This $100,000.00 together with defendant's
annual salary and other income of approximately $100,000.00 would make a
$200,000.00 taxable income for the year involved. On the basis of Schedule
Y, the applicable tax rate schedule for 1976, the taxes on $200,000.00 would
be $125,490.00. One-half of this would be applicable to the pension trust
income. This would amount to $62,745.00, leaving a net of $37,255.00 from
the $100,000. 00. Of course, defendant would probably have certain deductions
which he could claim to reduce the tax

somewhat, but it is clear that he

would still be required to pay at least $50,000.00 in taxes on the $100,000.00
from the trust fund.
It is hornbook law that tax consequences must be taken into account
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in any divorce property settlement award.

Stern v. Stern, 66 N.y. 340, 331 A.ZC

257; Kulav. Kula, 181 Neb. 531, 149 N.W.2d 430 (1967).

Therefore,

takingt~

above into account and subtracting from defendant's total property award the sum
of $50,000.00 attributable to the trust fund and $9,399.00 attributable to the 19i
tax refund it is apparent that defendant's property award was actually worth

I
$117, 451. 6 5 , where as plaintiff's property award was $115, 53 6 . 00 .
all of the Pinion, Supra, and

McDonald,~

Considering(

factors above discussed,

plaintiff's huge property settlement award constituted a blatant inequity to
defendant.
D. Defendant's suggested remedy of inequitable property distribution.
Defendant recognizes that a number of items of personal and real
property were distributed to the respective parties. An evaluation of the
propriety of each separate conveyance of property would be an unduly burdensome and laborious task which this court should not be called upon to perform.
Therefore, defendant respectfully requests that plaintiff be required to sell
the condominium and divide the proceeds with deferrlant.

Not only would

this solution be the easiest for the court to work with, but it would also be
best for plaintiff's interests.
The $80,000.00 condominium which consists of 3,100 square feet is
far too large for plaintiff's needs or even her 'reasonable" desires. With her
share of the proceeds from the sale of the condominium she could purchase
outright a smaller, yet very fashionable, and progressive home, apartment or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-18Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

condominium which would better befit her life style.

Her living expenses would

then be reduced since she would not be required to light, heat, care for and
maintain such an unduly large residence.
Defendant would also benefit since any decrease in plaintiff's living
expenses should result in a

concomitant decrease in his alimony payments.

He would, of course, also be entitled to part of the proceeds from the sale of
the condominium.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT ALIMONY AWARD OF $900.00 PER MONTH
WAS HIGHLY INEQUITABLE TO DEFENDA..l\J'T AND CONSTITUTED AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE TRIAL COURT.
The award of alimony granted plaintiff is far higher than any other
reported award of alimony ever approved by the Utah Supreme Court. Furthermore,
the permanence of the award makes it especially egregious to defendant.
It is clear from the McDonald and Pinion decisions that the same
factors governing property settlements also govern the award of alimony.
The same arguments made under Point II with respect to the inequity of the
property distribution are also fully applicable in the alimony context.

However,

when an award of alimony is bei ng contemplated as contrasted with a property
distrubtion, two factors stand out as being of paramount importance. One,
the needs of the spouse to whom alimony will be awarded.

Carter v. Carter,

563 P.2d 177 (Utah 1977); Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Barrett
v. Barrett, 17 Utah 2d 1, 403 P.2d 649 (1965); Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah
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504, 229 P.2d 681 {1951). Two, the duration of the marriage.

Frank v. Frank,

18 Utah 2d 228, 419 P.2d 199 (1966); Barrett v. Barrett, Supra; Anderson v.
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P.2d 252 {1943); Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255,
67 P.2d 265 (1937); Schuster v. Schuster, 88 Utah 257, 53 P.2d 428 {1936).
A.

Needs of Spouse.

Barrett v. Barrett, Supra, deals with a remarkably similar fact situation
and forcefully illustrates that a wife's alimony should not be greater than her
needs.

In this case, the trial court granted the plaintiff-wife a divorce and

awarded her $250.00 in monthly alimony payments, $200.00 in child support
payments, and a $15,000.00 property settlement.

However, the court required

her to reconvey to defendant a diamong ring worth $9,500.00 which her defendc:
husband had purchased for her.

Although the defendant-husband had a net

worth of $1 ,200,000.00, the Supreme Court limited the alimony obligations
imposed upon him and made the following pertinent observations:
"The custody of the daughter Michele, now three years
of age, is of course properly with the plaintiff and the
$200.00 per month is a suitable award for her support.-..
In view of the defendant's comparative affluence the property
settlement of $15,000.00 is likewise appropriate; and there
no particular reason to disagree with the return of the
$9,500.00 diamond ring. However, the award of $250.00
per month alimony on an indefinite basis we believe is not
justified. This was a misadventure in marriage for both
parties and was of comparatively short duration. The
plaintiff is a young woman with a life expectancy of over
thirty years so that award could amount to many thousands
of dollars. It is true that she does have the responsibility
of being a mother to Michele. Yet she had been married before
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I

and has other children. The actual care and support of Michele
is presumably compensated for by the $200.00 per month.
Further, it should not be assumed that the plaintiff is or will
remain helpless. She held a responsible position prior to this
marriage. It is our opinion that under all of the circumstances
shown equity and justice will be served by placing some
reasonable limitation upon the award of alimony and that after
a period of two years it should cease."
The Barrett decision and the other foregoing cases all require that this
court carefully evaluate the needs of plaintiff.

In doing so, the following should

be kept in mind:
In July of 1976 plaintiff submitted a list of her monthly expenses to
Judge Conder in a prior hearing in this case. The total of those monthly
expenses as she itemized them on that list came to $598.00.

44

However,

just a few months later when the trial of this case actually commenced,
plaintiff submitted a new itemization of her monthly expenses.

45

On this

list plaintiff claimed her monthly expenses were $842.00. Obviously, there
is a $244.00 per month discrepancy between plaintiff's two evaluations of her
necessary monthly expenses.
There can be no question but that plaintiff's second itemization
(Ex. No. 16) is grossly inflated. For example, she valued her monthly
telephone bill at $45.00, when she testified that her flat rate was merely
$13.50 per month.

44

45
46

46

She itemized her Mountain Fuel gas bill as $60.00

Red TR. p. 68; Green TR. p. 56; D. Ex. No. 29.
P. Ex. No. 16.
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per month, and yet her very own exhibit (P. Ex. No. 34) reveals that she
only spent an average of $22.54 per month on gas.

Plaintiff estimated her

monthly medical and dental expenses to be $50.00 and yet also added an
additional $30.00 per month to pay for medical insurance. Obviously,
plaintiff is trying to claim a double expense for precisely the same item, since
her medical insurance should cover the bulk of her potential medical and dental
bills. It is also very interesting to note that even though plaintiff does not

hav;l

a job to which she must drive to and from each day, she nevertheless budgeted
$100.00 for gasoline and maintenance on her automobile. This is in sharp
contrast to the $50.00 gas and maintenance expenses which she had estimated
.

but six months prev10usly.
own individual expenses.

47

Plaintiff was also extremely lavish with her

In her latest listing of expenses,

48

she budgeted

$265.00 per month for such things as clothing, art and pottery classes, and
entertainment.
It is painfully obvious from the aforementioned discussion that plaintifi
is seeking to reap a windfall from her brief marital sojourn with defendant.
Defendant submits that plaintiff tried to be fairly reasonable in her first
itemization of living expenses ($598 .00) but was totally unreasonable and
avaricious in her second itemization ($842 .00).
Furthermore, when evaluating plaintiff's needs, one must consider
47

48

D. Ex. No. 29.
P • Ex. No . 1 6 .
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I
I

the fact that she is a relatively young, able-bodied woman who is trained
and licensed as an expert medical technician. She should have absolutely
no trouble whatsoever in obtaining gainful employment to supplement her
alimony. The Utah cases have all taken this factor strongly into account
in evaluating what the wife's potential needs are.
B. Short Duration of Marriage.
There are many Utah cases which forcefully establish that when the
duration of a marriage is relatively short the plaintiff-wife is not entitled to
a substantial award of alimony. For example, in Frank v. Frank, Supra, the
husband brought an action for divorce but the trial court entered a decree
of divorce for the defendant-wife on her counterclaim. The trial court awarded
the wife alimony in the sum of $200.00 a month for three years. The wife
appealed this alimony award contending that it was inequitable. The Supreme
Court in rejecting appellant's contention held that the record including the
fact of the short lived marriage supported the three year $200.00 a month
alimony award. The court stated:
"We think that the trial court arrived at an equitable
conclusion in case of a very short lived marriage. The
record indicates that on believable evidence the other
party was in a very much different position financially
before and after the fortunate or unfortunate walk to the
alter."
In the landmark decision of Pinion v. Pinion, Supra, the trial court granted
the wife a divorce from her husband after four years of marriage. The court gave
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her $55.00 a month alimony with no fixed cut-off period. The husband appealed
contending that the trial court had abused its discretion. The Supreme Court
agreed with the husband and reduced his alimony obligation to a lump sum payme
of $2,000.00.

In support of its holding, the court stated:

"As a general rule a young couple, married a short time,
who break up with no children, would call it a misadventure
in matrimony, and unless the wife has suffered more than
the ordinary wear and tear of matrimony, or stands by the
divorce to lose substantial material benefits in economic
status or loss of inheritance, no alimony ordinarily will
be given.
"As to the age when they part company. She is 44. That
and the fact that she was married four years would ordinarily
entitle her to a substantial portion of his property if the
interruption of her former career by marriage left her
materially worse off in opportunity as compared to where
she might have been had it not been for the interruption,
or the opportunity or ability for readjustment had materially
suffered. Otherwise, four years out of one's life well
supported, with a return to singleness, cannot necessarily
be counted as a detriment." [Emphasis added]

In the instant case, plaintiff cannot count her marriage to defendant as
a detriment.

She is not now materially worse off than she was prior to their

marriage. On the contrary, she is in a much better financial position now
considering the generous property award which the trial court granted her.
Schuster v. Schuster, Supra, is a final case which bears consideratio:.
In that case, the marriage duration was slightly less than four years. Both
parties had children from prior spouses, but there was no issue born to their
marriage.

Both spouses were middle aged. The trial court granted the wife
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6 .

divorce.

However, she appealed seeking that her alimony award be increased

to $95.00 per month. The court refused to do so, stating:
"Considering, however, the comparatively short duration
of the marriage and the probability that the plaintiff may
be able to increase her independent income which, she
testified, was reduced by reason of the marriage, we are
of the opinion that the total amount of alimony should be
fixed at the sum of $1,500.00, and when this amount has
been paid the defendant should be relieved from payment of
further sums of alimony. "
C.

Permanence of Award.

Not only is the amount of the award excessive, but the permanent
nature of said award makes it intolerable. One of the trial court's objectives
in granting a divorce is the "eliminization or minimizing of frictions or
difficulties in the future".

DeRosa v. DeRosa, 19 Utah 2d 77, 426 P.2d 221

(1968). Recognizing this as an objective, trial courts are usually loathe to
grant permanent alimony awards, since such awards create continual friction
and interaction between a former husband and wife. See, for example,
Christensen v. Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 2 63, 444 P. 2d 511 (1968). In the
instant case, plaintiff's award of permanent alimony can do nothing but ignite
an already explosive situation.
It is also very instructive to note that very few Utah cases have ever
awarded permanent alimony. In almost all Utah cases the alimony award
extends for a certain finite period, such as two or three years. Often when
the trial court has attempted to indefinitely extend alimony, the Supreme Court
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has shortened the period. Wilson v. Wilson, Supra; Pinion v. Pinion, Supr3;
Porter v. Porter, Supra.
D.

Defendant's Suggested Remedy of Alimony Inequity.

Defendant does not suggest that plaintiff be left without any alimony
at all. Rather, defendant suggest that plaintiff be granted alimony in the
sum of $65 0. 0 0 per month for a three-year period.

Such an award would

comport with the trial court's order of temporary support in this case, which
was rendered on July 14, 1976. Pursuant to the provisions of that order,
defendant was required to pay plaintiff the sum of $650.00 per month as
temporary alimony.

Such an amount is ample to provide for plaintiff's rather

luxurious needs (P. Ex. No. 29).

This is especially tru.e since plaintiff

could use her share of the proceeds from the sale of the condominium to
purchase a new residence outright. Thus, she would not be required to make
any mortgage or rental payments.
Three years should give plaintiff ample time to obtain gainful employme:
and readjust her life to new circumstances.

Moreover, plaintiff's children

are already for the most part self-sufficient, and in three years they will
undoubtedly be even more so. Therefore, defendant submits that a threeyear award of alimony at the sum of $6 50.00 per month is totally adequate
to provide for plaintiff's needs and allow her to live at the standard of living
to which she has become accustomed.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the circumstances in this case, the total dollar value of
plaintiff's property award and her permanent alimony award in the sum of
$900. 00 per month are both extremely excessive. Had plaintiff and defendant
been married for twenty-five or thirty years, had they had numerous children,
had plaintiff been totally incapable of obtaining any gainful employment, had
plaintiff contributed substantial assets to the marriage, and had defendant
not adequately provided for the needs of his family during the tenure of the
marriage; the situation presented by this case might be vastly different.
However, none of those vital factors are present here. Plaintiff possessed
practically no assets when she entered into her marriage with defendant.
Everything which was acquired during the marriage was acquired solely as a
result of defendant· s efforts. The marriage was of very short duration, lasting
only six years and seven months. No children were born as a result of this
marriage. Plaintiff never worked to help support the family, even though
defendant suggested it on numerous occasions. Finally, defendant was a
very generous provider to both Mrs. Wilson and her two children by a
previous marriage.

As a result thereof, both Mrs. Wilson and the children

were able to acquire substantial and valuable personal property which otherwise
they would not now possess.
Defendant desires to be fair and wants to provide plaintiff with
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the necessary means to accustom herself to a new life. It is submitted that
plaintiff's suggestions -- sale of condominium with a division of the proceeds
and reduction of alimony to $650.00 for three years -- will accomplish this
purpose and yet will cure the glaring inequity which now burdens him as a
result of the trial court's judgment.

Pursuant to the foregoing discussion,

defendant, therefore, respectfully requests that this court modify the trial
court's decree and grant defendant relief as prayed.
Dated this

/?

day of December, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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